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WHY CAN’T A DUCK SIGN A CONTRACT? 
THE FAILURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT
“Human relations and the relations to other beings in our age.” There are 
three components to this theme: human-to-human relationships, human-to-other 
being relationships, and the temporal focus of our age. In the following, I will 
both discuss theoretical concerns among these components as well as present case 
studies to illustrate my points.  In asking why a duck cannot sign a contract, I 
hope to demonstrate inherent insufficiencies in relations between humans and other 
beings in our age when they are characterized as legal property relations.
Among the possible forms that could relate humans to other humans and other beings, 
global society often resorts to law.  Relationships in other, more culturally-dependent 
arenas, are more difficult to navigate when the cultures speak different languages, 
follow different religions, and build different family structures.  Indeed we are not 
globalized in these cultural areas. We are globalized economically. And insofar as law 
facilitates globalization, the economic norms it uses become the common denominator 
among the cultures and even the relationship between humans and other beings.
Exigency:  The Temporal  Focus of  Our Age
Among the three components of this theme, let me begin with the temporal focus 
of our age. The well-chosen topics of current pressing issues—globalization, ecology 
and economy--in some ways converge, if we reflect a bit on European history. For 
example, Marx opens his essay “The Eighteenth Brumaire” with the famous line 
that history repeats itself, with people and events occurring first as tragedy and then 
returning as farce.1  Environmental lawyer and scholar, Michael Gerard, has compared 
our inability to do anything about climate change to the unheeded drumbeats in the 
months before August in the year 1914. One hundred years later, the drumbeats warn 
of irreversible changes to nature, but we do nothing. In fact, we have already had 
the first battle of the new war—literally—when in 2005, the Sudanese erupted in a 
civil war over water, not oil. The United Nations declared it the first water war. As 
history repeats, apparently we have learned at least this: World War I was called the 
“Great War” until World War II erupted. Now, at least with the Sudanese water war, 
we immediately see that it will only be the first in a series.
The Great War is not just a helpful metaphor. The socio-economic conditions of 
that time have returned as well. Just before the Great War, Europe and the United 
1.  Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” in Die Revolution, New York, 1852.
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States had just gone through thirty years of industrial boom. As John Maynard 
Keynes reminds us, “the internationalization [of social and economic life at that 
time] was nearly complete in practice.”2 To invoke a term not then yet in use—the 
world seemed to be flat. This precedent should make us cautious today.
The first age of globalization came to a shuddering halt. Thanks to the 
Great War and its aftermath, economic growth in Europe did not recover its 
1913 levels until well into the 1950s. The apparently unstoppable logic of 
economics was in fact trumped by the rise of new antagonistic states. Great 
empires—the Russian, the Austrian, the Turkish, the German and eventually 
the British—all collapsed. Only the United States stood to gain from this 
international cataclysm: and even the US did not profit . . .until nearly thirty 
years after the end of the war that brought it all about . . ..3
All that destruction was history as tragedy.
And now comes history as farce. “Today, it is as though the 20th century never 
happened. We have been swept up [again by the same] master narrative of ‘integrated 
global capitalism’, economic growth and indefinite productivity gains...[Historian 
Tony Judt tells us that] ‘Globalization’ is an updating of the [same] high modernist 
faith in technology and rational management which marked the enthusiasms of the 
decades leading to the Great War.4
The Theory:  Law as  a  Funct ion of  Global ized Economics—
Human Relat ions
Having located the temporal concerns of our age as such, I shift my focus to the 
relations among humans. Our farcical return to the socio-economic conditions that 
preceded the Great War finds the puppeteering of our relations to other humans and 
other beings by economics through law. The hand inside the puppet is economic 
greed. The puppet is the law as handled by the economy to keep us in the audience 
entertained and maybe even leading us to believe in the reality of puppets.
Thus, in the present era when the state has been vilified, the role of law is seen not 
as the creation and implementation of public order for the many, but as the instrument 
to create and maintain the wealth of the few. There is no rational basis for a legal 
system that uses public money to bail out J. P. Morgan, so that J. P. Morgan can 
turn around and pay massive bonuses to its executives and then do things like lose 
9 billion dollars more, still playing with economic toys like derivatives just a few 
months later.5 So at the same time that the globalization puppeteers tell us the world is 
2.  John Maynard Keynes, “The Economic Consequences of Peace” in The End of Laissez-Faire and the 
Economic Consequences of Peace (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2004) p. 62, as edited by Tony 
Judt in Ill Fares the State, pp. 191-92.
3.  Judt, 192.
4.  Id., 193.
5.  Jessical Silver-Greenberg and Susanne Craig, “J. P. Morgan Trading Loss May Reach US$ 9 Billion” 
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flat and we are all best identified as units in a market, they ask law to be the common 
denominator of its global economic order. The other part of the return of history 
as farce is that as technology discovers new ways to invent products—even living 
products—and manage them, law, under the control of economics, facilitates this. So 
if we ask law in the 21st century to be the common denominator of a global flat world 
of market economies, we are going to get a world in which our relations to human and 
other life is not only legal, but is legal when law is seen as a function of economics.6
The Case Study:  From Dolly to  Delhi
Having presented my concerns of the temporal aspects of our age and human 
relations, I now turn to human relations to other beings. In general, I am concerned 
with the legal relations of humans to humans and the other. In specific, I am concerned 
with the legal relations of humans to humans and other beings as property.
There are several examples of ways in which we relate ourselves to other humans 
as property.  For example, we assign a monetary value to a person’s life wrongfully 
killed or injured in an accident, or when we write insurance contracts in which we, 
as legal beings, agree in advance the monetary value of a lost eye or leg. But right 
now I want to focus on other beings as property, with property being understood 
as the law does—a bundle of rights. Humans buy and sell other living animals and 
plants. States claim sovereign control rights over any living thing in their territory. 
Sport killing is accepted so long as it is protected by a license to hunt. Animals 
may be caged, tied or involuntarily fed, so long as it is within legal limits. But I 
want to narrow my focus even further to one type of legal relationship of humans 
to humans and to other beings—the patent.
Since states began recognizing the right of individuals to own the products of 
their intellect and not just the products of their hands, money-makers push for 
the expansion of those rights through broad interpretations of the laws that enable 
them. Lawyers refer to this as “the expansion of statutory subject matter.”7 At the 
time of the Enlightenment, when the United States established independence from 
Britain, it borrowed a distinction made by Aristotle when it wrote in its constitution 
that Congress shall have the power to “promote the progress of science and useful 
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right 
to their respective writings and discoveries.”8 As written, one would expect that 
such a constitutional provision was a legal response to a perceived problem—the 
time, energy, effort, intellect and resources invested by one person could simply 
New York Times on-line, June 28, 2012
6.  Judt, 200.
7.  Robert Greene Sterne and Lawrence B. Bugaisky, “The Expansion of Statutory Subject Matter under 
the 1952 Patent Act”, 37 Akron Law Review 217 (2004).
8.  U.S Constitution, Art. I, § 8 cl. 8.
WHY CAN’T A DUCK SIGN A CONTRACT? 97
be copied or stolen by another. It was no different than stealing material property. 
So we needed to protect intellectual property from theft just as we would protect 
material property from theft. In current practice, however, the ability to make legal 
claim on ideas and patterns becomes the goal itself of industries, facilitated by 
the law, and these industries include the idea of making legal claim to life forms 
created for the sole purpose of making money, not to promote the sciences and 
useful arts. Notice too that the language allows patents to protect property rights 
for inventions in sciences and the useful arts—not in necessities. So one can well 
imagine patenting industrial machinery that provides commercial advantage, but 
not food that is necessary for human life.
Congress quickly exercised that power just four years later when in 1793 it passed 
the Patent Act that Thomas Jefferson had written. The Patent Act defined the four 
classes of statutory subject matter as “art, machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter.” Jefferson believed that “ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.”9 
Subsequent patent statutes in 1836, 1870, and 1874 all used this same language.
In 1889 during the first great wave of industrialism, a patent claim for fiber 
found in the needle of a coniferous tree was rejected by the U.S. patent office. The 
patent commissioner wrote that allowing such a patent would permit “patents [to] 
be obtained upon the trees of the forest and the plants of the earth, which of course 
would be unreasonable and impossible.”10 In his book-length study of permanence 
and change, rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke concluded in the middle of the 
20th century that that which is biological is permanent, and that which is social is 
changeable.11 In 1940, a federal court concluded that bacteria were not patentable.12 
In 1948, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote that discoveries concerning “manifestations 
of nature [are] free to all men and reserved exclusively to no one.”13 
In 1952 the “statutory subject matter” was expanded for the first time by replacing 
the word “art” with “process,” thus resulting in the current language protecting 
process, machine, manufacture or composition.14 Machine and manufacture are 
clearly industrial terms that do not seem to line up very tightly with the constitution’s 
protection of useful arts and sciences. Kenneth Burke may have had it wrong 
when he concluded that the biological was permanent, but he seems to have had 
keen insight when he concluded that the American constitution is an occasion 
of “business in a mood of mild self-criticism.”15 The Congressional Committee 
Reports accompanying the 1952 Act state that Congress intended statutory subject 
9.  5 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 75-76 (Washington ed. 1871).
10.  Ex Parte Latimer, 1889 Dec.Com.Pat. 123.
11.  Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change, University of California Press, 1963.
12.  In re Arzberger, 27 C.C.P.A. (Pt.) 1315, 112 F.2d 834 (1940).
13.  Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) at 130.
14.  The 1952 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §101.
15.  Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, University of California, 1966.
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matter to “include anything under the sun that is made by man.”16 According to the 
United States Supreme Court, that does not mean that the U.S. statute has no limits. 
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas continued to be held by 
U.S. courts to be not patentable. 
As recently as 1980, in an effort to show that legal protection for property has 
limits, that same Supreme Court cited cases in its own history to support the notion 
that “The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held 
not patentable.”17  The Court went on: “A new mineral discovered in the earth or 
a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise Einstein 
could not patent his celebrated law E = mc²; nor could Newton have patented the 
law of gravity.”18  But the year was 1980 and despite this language acknowledging 
limitations for private property rights over nature, the U.S. Supreme Court went on 
to grant a patent for bacteria to microbiologist Anand M. Chakrabarty, finding it to 
be “a thing under the sun made by man.”19 Specifically, that 1980 Supreme Court 
said that the “relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but 
between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.”20 
Shortly thereafter, in 1985, the U.S. Patent and Trademark office granted a patent 
for multicellular plants.21 As the legal wall of limitations quickly tumbled, in 1987 
the “Harvard Mouse” became the first patented mammal. It was still the 1980s, and 
as historian Tony Judt points out, the cycle of history had returned us to the 1880s’ 
intoxication with industry.22 As the Soviet Union collapsed, it was Happy Hour for 
bartenders Thatcher and Reagan, serving industrial cocktails to the public, getting 
lawyers and their clients to line up for the opportunity to gain private property 
rights over everything, including living plants and animals. 
Near the end of the 20th century, biologist-turned-sociologist Nikolas Rose 
once made a striking observation at the annual meeting of the British Sociological 
Association. Contrary to Kenneth Burke’s conclusions, Rose noted that the 
social sciences historically had proceeded based upon the notion that if we could 
understand the social world of the human, we could change them for the better, and 
the natural sciences had proceeded based upon the notion that we cannot change 
16.  S.Rep.No. 1979 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R.Rep.No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2dSess., 6 (1952)
17.  Le Roy. Tatham, 14 How.  156, 14 L.Ed. 367s. 127 (1948), (1853): O’Reilly v. Morse 15 How. 62, 14 
L.Ed. 601 (1854), Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Gottschalk 
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), 333 U.Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
18.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
19.  Chakrabarty, at 309.
20.  Chakrabarty at 313.
21.  Ex Parte Hibbard, 227 U.S.P.Q 443 (B.P.A.I. 1985); and in 2000 a US federal appeals court con-
firmed the idea in a different case decision. Pioneer Hi Bred. Inc. v. J.E.M. Agric. Supply, Inc., 200 
F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
22.  Judt, passim.
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the physical world.  But when Dolly the sheep was cloned, Rose reflected on our 
apparent inability to change destructive social behavior, and concluded that it might 
well be the case that the physical is changeable and the social is not changeable.23
Where has that history and this legal standard left us in our relations to the world 
of other living beings?  Patents are now already obtained on life forms that are 
characterized not as products of nature, but as “commodities.” It is now possible 
to patent entire species of microorganisms. Genetically-engineered mice have been 
patented as “inventions.” Patents have been granted on human genes, cell lines and 
body tissues.
The legal right to private intellectual property is usually referred to as protection 
of one’s right.  Yet, concerning the right, one would be hard pressed to find a case 
in which an individual has taken a legal action to protect his right, if he could not 
prove that he had lost money due to another person’s having made money. The 
industrialized nature of research means that corporations hold intellectual property 
rights and they do so of course for profit, not because of some social desire to respect 
and promote rights. Furthermore, the right is styled as one in need of protection; 
that is, of defending. To investigate how our legal relationship to other beings 
works, let us ask the question whether intellectual property rights are exercised 
defensively, to foster the arts and sciences by protecting the rights of inventors, or 
are they exercised offensively, as economic weapons in the hands of artificial legal 
persons, such as corporations. The answer is the latter—they even have names like 
bioprospecting, biopiracy and biocolonialism. Case studies will illustrate.
The first case is the celebrated case of Canadian farmer Percy Schmeiser, who has 
grown rapeseed on his farm in Saskatchewan for nearly fifty years, usually sowing 
each crop of plants with seeds saved from the previous harvest, just as his father 
and grandfather did before him.  He has never purchased seed from the American 
agricultural and biotechnology Monsanto Corporation. Even so, more than 320 
hectares of Schmeiser’s land became contaminated by Monsanto’s rapeseed, a man-
made variety produced by genetic engineering to resist Monsanto’s own herbicide, 
known by the brand name “Roundup.” According to the rhetorical position in the law 
given to patent holders, they are to be “protected” from persons who would benefit from 
the research and labor put into the patent without having paid money for that benefit. 
In practice however it is Monsanto that has gone on the offense, taking hundreds of 
North American farmers to court, claiming they illegally planted Monsanto’s rapeseed 
without paying a $37-per-hectare fee for the privilege. Most of these hundreds of 
farmers do not have the economic resources to fight a legal battle against Monsanto, 
so whether they intentionally used Monsanto’s patent-protected genetically-modified 
23.  Nikolas Rose, British Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Edinburgh, April 1998. Notes on 
file with author.  Rose was then with Goldsmith’s College and at the time of this writing, is with the 
London School of Economics.
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rapeseed, or the birds, bees, wind and perhaps even Monsanto itself put the rapeseed 
on their land, the farmers settle the legal claims by paying Monsanto. According to 
Schmeiser, Monsanto’s “seed could easily have blown on to his soil from passing 
canola-laden trucks.  “I never put those plants on my land,” insists Schmeiser.24
But unlike the other farmers, Schmeiser was so enraged by the legal aggression 
of Monsanto, he decided the best defense was offense. He filed his own legal 
actions against Monsanto, because Monsanto’s investigators trespassed on his land. 
“The question is, where do Monsanto’s rights end and mine begin?”25 (As an aside 
Schmeiser notes that the promise of genetically-modified, patented food has been 
greater yield, better quality and fewer herbicides and pesticides. After more than 
ten years of use, farmers in North America report lower yield, lower quality and 
the use of more herbicides and pesticides. And so Schmeiser concludes that we 
should be very clear about something—biotechnology and biopatenting are market 
products for profit. They are not curing cancer and feeding the world.) Yet as John 
Maynard Keynes once remarked, “We are capable of shutting off the sun and the 
stars because they do not pay a dividend.”26
Were this any other product on the market, given the product’s failure to perform 
as promised, it should theoretically have been abandoned by choice by now. But 
because Monsanto’s business model is to force farmers to sign exclusivity agreements 
for seed supply, after contaminating fields with their patented plants, the fairy tale 
market solution is inapplicable. Of course, this business model is made all the more 
effective because of the 1998 patent owned by Monsanto for the “Control of Plant 
Gene Expression,” better known as the terminator patent.  This genetic modification 
sterilizes the seed of the plants so that each year, one must buy a completely new 
batch of seeds from Monsanto, rather than use the seeds from the previous year’s 
harvest, as is done in traditional farming.  Monsanto obtained 89 new patents in the 
first six months of 2012 alone on soybeans, as well as tomatoes, corn, cucumbers, 
and rice. And it is not just Monsanto and is not limited to these foods.
Other results of commercial gain from biopatenting are the fact that the world’s 
“biodiversity is down thirty percent since the 1970s . .. with tropical species taking 
the biggest hit.  . . . Humanity is outstripping the Earth’s resources by 50 percent—
essentially using the resources of one and a half Earths every year, . . .”27 according 
to the World Wildlife Fund in its 2012 Living Planet Report.  Biopatenting has 
contributed to that life-threatening trend as well. We should take note of the 
24.  Mark Nichols, “Tampering with the Natural Order,” Macleans Magazine May 17, 1999.
25.  Id.
26.  John Maynard Keynes, as quoted in Judt, 156.
27.  Stephanie Pappas, “Report: Global Biodiversity Down 30 Percent in 40 Years,” LiveScience, May 
14, 2012,. http://www.livescience.com/20307-biodiversity-natural-resources.html, accessed May 
16, 2012
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benchmark years in which events converge—the Reagan-Thatcher economy was 
the background during which the legal system reversed itself from not allowing 
patents on life to allowing patents on life. And what have been the results in that 
time? A thirty percent drop in biodiversity, lower crop yield, lower quality crops and 
more herbicides and pesticides. But of course, more profit for the patent owners.
The globalized nature of the Enlightenment legal idea of patent, even as it extends 
to life forms, finds its way into the luggage of pharmaceutical and agricultural 
companies wherever they travel. Biopiracy cases typically involve a North American 
or European biotechnology corporation seeking to “acquire,” genetically copy, and 
alter agricultural and medicinal plants grown in biodiversity hotspots like Brazil, 
Peru and India. Before it legislated its own anti-biopiracy statute in 2002, India 
had prosecuted biopiracy cases in India involving turmeric, rice and neem under 
international law in international courts.  
The neem tree, a native of the Indian subcontinent, has had many applications in 
traditional Indian Ayurvedic and Tibetan medicine, agriculture, and household use, 
as well as being symbolic as “Gandhi’s favorite tree.”  The Latin name, Azadirachta 
indica, is derived from the Persian for “free tree,” as even the poorest families have 
access to its beneficial properties.  However, Indian citizens would have been required 
to pay royalties on the products of the neem after a U.S. patent had been granted to 
the W.R. Grace Company on a compound in the tree (azadirachtin), which Grace 
used for the production of a biopesticide.  However, like Percy Schmeiser, the Indian 
government was not content with this use of the law, and took its own legal action.
In 1995, the United States Department of Agriculture and the multinational company 
W. R. Grace obtained a patent in the United States on a neem-based fungicide.  India 
appealed the granting of the patent by proving that the neem’s use has been part of the 
traditional knowledge of Indian farmers and the scientific community for centuries. 
As a result, in 2000 the United States revoked the patent.  However, the patent 
application in Europe lived on.  Then, on March 8, 2005, India won the battle against 
the granting of the patent for the neem-based fungicide by the European Patent Office 
(EPO).  W. R. Grace’s appeal against the revocation was rejected by the EPO office 
after several Indian and international groups presented evidence to support the claim 
that the use of neem in varied forms was part of traditional Indian knowledge and 
that it was not a novel product.  “It was pure and simple piracy. The oil from neem 
has been used traditionally by farmers to prevent fungus. It was neither a novel idea 
nor was it invented,” said Vandana Shiva of the Research Foundation for Science, 
Technology and Ecology and one of the country’s foremost agricultural experts.”28
Then in February 2010, the Environmental Support Group, an NGO, filed a 
28.  Indo-Asian News Service, March 9, 2005, www.bbcnews.com, March 9, 2005, and The Hindu, 
March 9, 2005, all accessed November 11, 2014 through http://infochangeindia.org/trade-a-devel-
opment/news-scan/india-wins-landmark-neem-patent-battle-in-europe.html
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complaint with the Karnataka state biodiversity board in India, against Monsanto, 
its Indian subsidiary Mahyco, and University of Agricultural Sciences, Dharwad, 
for having taken six varieties of Indian brinjal (eggplant), which they then modified 
to become Bt Brinjal, “for commercial purposes.”29 “This modification is similar 
to Monsanto’s other transgenic crops, including the infamous Bt cotton, the use 
of which has resulted in the loss of jobs for thousands of Indian farmers.”30  And 
when the traditional farmers lose their jobs, they migrate to the cities adding further 
crowding to already over-crowded cities.31
In January, 2012, the Indian National Biodiversity Authority (NBA) decided to 
file a legal action against Monsanto and the Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Company 
(Mahyco) for failing to acquire proper licenses before conducting field trials in six 
genetically-modified varieties of brinjal before growing the plant.  This would have 
been the first time the NBA had prosecuted firms for violating the 2002 Biodiversity 
Act.  The Act requires anyone who desires to use Indian-produced biological goods 
for commercial purposes to seek permission from the NBA.  That permission is 
required, even if, as in Monsanto’s case, the material has been modified by Indian 
universities.32 Importantly, the NBA’s decision to initiate legal proceedings was 
prompted by a complaint filed in 2010 by the Bangalore-based Environmental 
Support Group (ESG). Bhargavi Rao, of ESG, says the Genetic Engineering 
Approval Committee (GEAC) which is India’s official regulatory agency for GM 
organisms, considers only the biochemistry of a proposed biotech crop and not 
input from the farmers. The Indian biodiversity act, says Rao, obligates commercial 
developers of GM crops to negotiate with farmers for the intellectual rights to 
breeds and traits developed by indigenous farmers and their ancestors.33  But then 
on January 20, 2012, the Karnataka State Biodiversity Board voted not to prosecute 
Monsanto, Mahyco and the University of Agricultural Sciences, Dharwad which 
support them due to lack of staff and technical expertise to pursue the case. “The 
Act is new and our officers are not well versed with it. We don’t have the powers 
to prosecute anybody, it can be done only through the wildlife wing.”34 After the 
29.  Id. 
30.  Anne Sewell, ‘‘Bt brinjal row: India to now sue Monsanto/Mahyco,” Digital Journal, April 23, 
2012, accessed through http://digitaljournal.com/article/323168 on May 23, 2012.
31.  Bharachua, Erach, Shamita Kumar and Kranti Yardi of Bharati Vidyapeeth Institute for Environ-
ment Education and Research, Pune India.  Personal interview.  16 March 2012.
32.  Ranjit Devral, “Biodiversity or Biopiracy?“  India Together, December 2002, http://indiatogether.
org/environment/articles/biodiv02.htm, accessed May 23, 2012,
33.  Lucas Laursen, “Monsanto to face biopiracy charges in India,” Nature Biotechnology, vol. 30, no. 
1, January “BT brinjal row: National Biodiversity Authority decides to prosecute Monsanto,” India 
Today, April 17, 2012, on-line access of http://indiatodaz.intoday.in/story/bt-brinjal-row-monsanto-
to-pay-for-biodiversity-violation/184824.html on May 23, 2012.
34.  KSBB Member Secretary KS Sugara, interviewed by Imran Khan in Tehelka, India’s Independent 
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Karnatka State Biodiversity Board took this decision, the National Biodiversity 
Authority was forced to take up the claim.  In April 2012, India filed suit against 
Monsanto for violation of India’s Biodiversity Act. 
The cases are limited to agriculture, however.  “A most alarming aspect of patenting 
life is the patenting of human genes, cell lines and tissues. Corporate patent attorneys 
have lobbied the Patent office that these “products of nature” are patentable once they 
have been isolated to produce a form not found outside of a laboratory. For example, in 
1976 a leukemia patient named John Moore had surgery at the University of California 
to remove his cancerous spleen. The University was later granted a patent for a cell 
line that had been removed from the spleen, and which could be used for producing 
valuable proteins. The long term commercial value of the cell line was estimated at 
over one billion dollars.  Moore demanded the return of the cells and control over his 
body parts, but the California Supreme Court decided that he was not entitled to any 
rights to his own cells after they had been removed from his body.”35
Law NOT in the Service of  Economics.  Aris tot le’s  Implemen -
ta t ion of  Plato’s  Republic
So what does Greek philosophy have to do with these 21st century problems in 
the legal relationship of humans to humans and other beings?  Within the Western 
tradition, Greek philosophy provides two viable counter-conceptions of law: first, 
it describes the role of law without being a subset of economics and second it 
describes the role of law without relying upon it as the global equalizer. If we have 
gone so far as to buy into the globalized nature of western legal thinking in our 
relations to non-legal beings, we need to consider whether within western legal 
thinking there is potential for change. What does Aristotle see for the role of law? 
It is not a globalizing equalizer. Aristotle bases his role for law on the position of 
his teacher, Plato, as Ploto set it forth in Protagoras, Republic and Laws.36 “Laws 
should in the first place stimulate men to virtue and urge them forward by the 
motive of the noble; in other words the first function of the law is persuasive. 
Where this persuasive power of the laws does not suffice punishments and penalties 
are needed. This deterrent and corrective function of the laws applies to those who 
can be made better, who are “curable.” As for the incurably bad the law should 
exclude them, banish them from the state community.  ‘A good man, since he lives 
with his mind fixed on what is noble, will submit to  argument, while a bad man, 
Weekly News Magazine, vol. 9, issue 8, February 25, 2012, accessed on-line May 23, 2012 at www.
tehelka.com/story_main51.asp?filename=Ne250212.
35.  . Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120; 271 Cal. Rptr. 146; 793 P.2d 479 
(1990).
36.  Protagoras, 325a, Republic 409e, 410a, Laws 941d, as synthesized by Max Hamburger, Morals and 
Law: The Growth of Aristotle’s Legal Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press) 1951, p 177.
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whose desire is for pleasure, is corrected by pain.’37
However, while Aristotle would focus upon what a person would learn from 
the actual concrete laws of his or her culture, my question is what one learns of 
the world from the very notion of having a legal relationship to it at all?  And it is 
in this framework, that positive law, as pronounced by reason, can be a conscious 
tool in the hands of the powerful and an unwitting participatory ideology for those 
of lesser power. Aristotle’s faith in the reason of the individual is an insufficient 
explanation or justification for law as it functions synergistically among groups and 
even less sufficient when it attempts to mediate between cultures.
It would be too easy to say that in the Republic Plato advises that the ideal 
community is “a city which would be established in accordance with nature,”38 and 
that therefore the corrective for all that is wrong in the world is to get our societies 
back in accordance with nature. First of all, when environmentalists ask this of 
society, industrialists threaten that “tree-huggers want us to go back to the caves!” 
Second, we need a far more sophisticated understanding of what nature meant for 
the Athenians twenty-four centuries ago, if we are going to lift this phrase and 
apply it today.  This second point is illustrated by the fact that if the products of 
human reason ought to be considered natural, then atomic weapons and pesticides 
are natural—but that result would hardly seem to comport with the relationship that 
Plato and Aristotle so thoroughly considered between “nature” (physis, φύσις) on 
the one hand and „law,” „custom,“ or „convention“ (nomos, νóμος) on the other. 
The real question is whether the sense of natural law that thinkers like Aquinas 
delivered to the west under the pedigree of Aristotle, can really guide us through 
issues concerning our legal relationship to nature such as patenting living organisms 
and selling human body parts. The spectrum of possible human legal relationships to 
the non-human world offers several possibilities. At one end are the private property 
protectionists who will assert that without legal protection, there is no incentive to 
explore the arts and sciences. In other words, without making money, there is no 
incentive to explore the arts and sciences. This argument sounds defensible, perhaps 
even reasonable, given the current capital market Zeitgeist. But it also permits 
aggressive use of the property rights in ways that shocks most persons’ consciences.
With the ancient alternative idea of western legal relationships in mind, what hope 
might we find in legal relations?  In his questions concerning technology, Martin 
Heidegger reminds us that “where danger is, grows the saving power also.”39 Thus, 
37.  Nicomachean Ethics, X.9.10.1180a5 ff.
38.  Republic, 428e9
39.  Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology” (Originally: “Die Frage nach der Tech-
nik” in Vorträge und Aufsätze, 1954).  Heidegger once again quotes the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, 
finding in these lines from the poem „Patmos“ a formulation of the paradox he wants to describe: 
within the „supreme danger“ of humanity‘s enframing orientation to the world lies the potential of 
a rescue from that very danger.
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the Canadian farmer, Percy Schmeiser, after being appalled at the legal rulings against 
him, took his own legal action against Monsanto. “In an out of court settlement 
finalized on March 19, 2008, Percy Schmeiser settled his lawsuit with Monsanto. 
Monsanto agreed to pay all the clean-up costs of the Roundup Ready rapeseed that 
contaminated Schmeiser’s fields. Also part of the agreement was that there was 
no gag-order on the settlement and that Monsanto could be sued again if further 
contamination occurred. Schmeiser believes this precedent setting agreement ensures 
that farmers will be entitled to reimbursement when their fields become contaminated 
with unwanted Roundup Ready canola or any other unwanted GMO plants.”40
Another example of attempting to go to the source of the problem for the saving 
power might be the Nagoya Protocol to the Biodiversity Treaty. The Nagoya Protocol 
requires signatory states to conduct something called benefit-sharing, which had been 
an objective of the Treaty on Biodiversity signed in Rio in 1992, but was unfulfilled 
still fifteen years later. The objective of the Nagoya Protocol is the “equitable sharing 
of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate 
access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies.”41
Conclusions
Why can’t a duck sign a contract?  Not because it has no hands, but because it has 
no legal standing or legal rights.  Given that the human is in fact an animal, and the 
rapacious expansion of private rights over other living things through the expansion 
of statutory subject matter, do we expect to wait long before it will be legally possible 
for legally-protected property rights to extend to owning entire human beings?
In an effort to consider this rhetorical question concretely, rather than abstractly, 
let us review the history of legal rights over other lives and then consider the 
catalogue of current ownership. The Enlightenment basis had its greatest impact 
in Europe and North America.  Thus it comes as no surprise that the European idea 
of state-protected legal private property, as developed in North America, would 
be the globalized norm today. The alternative norm, in which the state owns all 
property, has seen a history of relatively short experiments ending in failure—the 
Soviet Union being the largest example. Even today, the globalization of China is 
facilitated through western property relations.
Recalling those dangerous days of bad choices and weak voices nearly one 
hundred years ago, Michael Gerrard concluded his 2007 keynote address to the 
Georgetown Environmental Law and Policy Institute with the following words that 
challenged us not to fail in legal choices today:
In some ways, today feels like the summer of 1914. Today, as then, the nations 
of the world know that something catastrophic may be about to happen. 
40.  http://www.percyschmeiser.com/ accessed June 18, 2012.
41.  Article 1, Nagoya Protocol.
106 KIRK W. JUNKER
Today, as then, the nations also know that they might be able to prevent 
further negative effects, and efforts are underway to stop it. However, in 1914, 
those efforts failed and the leaders who could have made a difference were 
unwilling to make the compromises and sacrifices that would be required. 
Thus, an unnecessary catastrophe did happen. We may be at another such 
historical moment right now. The decisions that are being made this year, and 
the decisions that will be made next year, will have lasting consequences for 
the globe. The importance of concerted effort and wise choices by the legal 
profession cannot be overstated.42
What can phi losophers  do? 
In late-18th century France, as the old regime tottered, the most significant 
developments on the political scene came not in the movements of protest or 
the institutions of the state which sought to head them off. They came, rather, 
in the very language itself. Journalists and pamphleteers, together with the 
occasional dissenting administrator or priest, were forging out of an older 
language of justice and popular rights a new rhetoric of public action.
Unable to confront the monarchy head-on, they set about depriving it of 
legitimacy by imagining and expressing objections to the way things were 
and positing alternative sources of authority in whom ‘the people’ could 
believe. In effect, they invented modern politics: and in so doing quite literally 
discredited everything that had gone before. By the time the Revolution itself 
broke out, this new language of politics was thoroughly in place: indeed, 
had it not been, the revolutionaries themselves would have had no way to 
describe what they were doing.  In the beginning was the word.43




42.  Michael Gerrard, ‘What the law and lawyers can and cannot do about climate change’, 16 South-
eastern Envtl. L. J. 33, 53-54 (Fall 2007) citing Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (1962) 
(recounting the events that took place during the first month of World War I) and Luigi Albertini, 
Origins of the war of 1914, 189-371(Isabella M. Massey trans. & ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 1953). 
Keynote address delivered on Sept. 21, 2007 at the conference, ‘Balancing private & public rights in 
the coastal zone in the era of climate change’ at the University of South Carolina School of Law.
43.  Judt, 171.
